Despite differences between Moscow and Peking, the Red bloc's coalescence is strong enough to hold together a multinational, multiracial conglomeration of peoples, with the continuing aim of imposing Communist totalitarianism on the world. Since earth-bound deterrence has prevented general war, it is possible that predominance in space may in the end become a decisive issue in the bipolar dispute. To meet the totalitarian-ideological challenge of Communist power, we must shed long-held policy concepts and throw an intellectual switch from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, in preparation for the twenty-first. These are some of the vital entries in the . . .

BALANCE SHEET of the PERMANENT CRISIS

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An excerpt from *The Permanent Crisis* (Walker and Company, New York, 1962, $6), by Dr. Kurt London. Copyright 1962 by Kurt London, reprinted with permission.

THERE are times in the lives of men and nations when it becomes imperative to pause, take stock, discard the obsolete, and start anew. The middle decades of our century were such a time. The problems to be solved came into focus, and the changes affecting the relations among nations clearly emerged. The outlook for the second half of the century became more penetrable.

Revolutions usually are directed against petrified traditions, views, and attitudes. The trouble is that they tend to become iconoclastic and destroy the good with the bad instead of replacing the old with the new. Recognition of this probability and adjustment to changing conditions can prevent violent upheavals while vigorously stimulating evolutionary actions. We do not need revolution to prevent entrenchment in a figurative Maginot Line of traditionalist concepts of foreign affairs.

In the preceding chapters, an attempt was made to call attention to the hazards of archaic thinking under the unprecedented conditions of contemporary world politics. Conventional subject matter was purposely retained as a point of departure since it is better to chart a new course from a known position than from parts unknown. But the revolutionizing developments in the nature and technique of international relations are anything but conventional. It should therefore be useful to recapitulate the most important factors which have led to a change of substance and an eclipse of traditional principles in international relations.

Broadly speaking, these factors are *ideology* and *technology*.

The sharp division of the world into two irreconcilable camps, with weak neutralist countries desperately trying to remain uncommitted, is basically the result of an ideological schism. It renders obsolete both the traditional outlook on world politics and the employment of traditional diplomacy except between nations of the free world.

Communist ideology has reshaped the bloc countries' thought and life. In striving for totality and integralism, it has developed different and unconventional approaches to international relations and foreign policy. It seeks to hasten what even the West has recognized as "the decline of the nation state."[1] With revolutionary aggressiveness it has forced the ideologically ill-prepared West into a defensive position. On the strength of doctrinal cohesion, the "world social system" or "Commonwealth of Socialist Countries"[2] came into being, commanding a large part of the world's natural resources and manpower.

There is no precedent in history for a universalist secular religion which, armed with modern means of communication, can reach all peoples of the world over the heads of their governments. Nor is there any precedent for a worldwide system of parties which overtly or covertly carries on Communist business against their own nations' interests. Were it not for totalitarian ideology and organization, first Fascist and then Communist, the free world would not now face permanent crisis.

If power per se were sought and contested, differences could reach eventual settlement as they have so

1. *The Mid-century Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy*, Special Studies Project I, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Doubleday & Co. Inc., New York, 1959, p. 487.

2. See London, "The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations," in *Orbis* Vol. III, No. 4, 1960, and E. R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State*, Columbia University Press, 1960, *passim*. Cf. also Z. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, Harvard University Press, 1960, *passim*.

drive harder. We approach the end of our conventional rope. We are losing. Or suppose we are holding, or even winning, when the Soviets introduce tactical nuclear weapons. What do we do? How many options are open to us? How flexible are we?

We can negotiate, with the terms highly unlikely to be in our favor.

Or we can escalate immediately from conventional war to an exchange of ICBMs, to the highest level of conflict, to the kind of war where we already have told ourselves that there are no winners.

Clearly we cannot confine our quest for flexibility to the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum. Further, we must build in flexibility from the top down, not from the bottom up. Unless we are willing to pay the price of being able to cope with every conceivable Soviet challenge in exact kind, we must give priority to the potential challenges which most seriously threaten our vital interests.

Flexible Response and Western Europe

For a dozen years or more the sword and shield concept of NATO has contained the vastly superior conventional forces of the Soviet Union and her East Europe satellites. The shield has been made up of NATO's ground forces and tactical air forces, armed with both conventional and nuclear weapons. There was never a question of attempting to contain a major Soviet assault, even a conventional one, with conventional weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons would be employed. The sword behind the shield was SAC, together with other strategic forces under the direct command of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Today the argument over conventional vs. nuclear weapons may prove to be the reef on which NATO founders. We are insisting that NATO's conventional capability is grossly inadequate and that this could result in nuclear war being forced upon us. The Europeans, who have lived in the Soviet shadow with equanimity all these years, are becoming increasingly apprehensive about the extent and nature of future US commitments in their behalf. They worry about our fear of using tactical nuclear weapons because they think it increases the danger of a major conventional war in their back yard. The Europeans know firsthand that conventional war is no consummation devoutly to be wished. And they tend to view any US policy shift in this direction as motivated primarily by a desire to keep a future war off US soil. De Gaulle's drive for an independent French nuclear deterrent derives in large part from his doubts about the future viability of US commitments. And British anger over our scuttling of her V-bombers by our virtual abandonment of the Skybolt missile is part of the same package.

But if Western Europe finds the thought of conventionally armed defenses distasteful, our own strategy is finding it more and more attractive. Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, speaking before the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in Paris last November, said:

"There is no reason why the NATO countries cannot maintain in the NATO area conventional forces that are at least equal to those in Eastern Europe."

Mr. McNamara has also indicated his belief that the NATO countries can increase their conventional defensive capabilities. The NATO nations will agree, but only reluctantly and under heavy pressure from the US.

We have not publicly renounced the first use of tactical nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe, nor is there any likelihood that we will do so soon or even ever. But the doctrine of nuclear stalemate, coupled with the theories of automatic escalation and flexible response, indicate that we are trying hard to remove these weapons from any battlefield of the future, even if this means risking large-scale conventional wars.

As far as Western Europe is concerned, the danger is twofold—first, that the doctrinal conflict will irreparably damage the Alliance, and second, that the Soviets will be encouraged to take new risks in the NATO area that could not have been justified when they were faced with the sword and shield concept.

More Options or Less?

No thoughtful person can quarrel with the idea of seeking as many alternatives as possible between surrender or holocaust. The real question is whether or not the current trends in strategy and force composition are really narrowing, rather than widening, the number of options that will be available as time goes on.

Consuming fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear war can deprive us of the main strategic advantage we possess today. It would reduce risks for the Soviet planners by concentrating future conflict in the conventional area, where the strategic advantage is clearly theirs. In addition, they know they can always pause for negotiations if the going gets too rough.

Far more worrisome, however, are the dangers inherent in unilateral acceptance of the strategic-stalemate concept. Indeed, the very fact that we accept a stalemate in itself breaks the stalemate in a psychological sense. A single technological breakthrough—with space offering an almost unlimited range of possibilities—could shatter the stalemate suddenly and irrevocably, permitting neither time nor opportunity to "fall back and re-grope."

Optimism is running high after the Soviet backdown in Cuba, and the temptation is to read more into that episode than is justified. One can make a case that the very attempt to emplace outflanking missiles on the island stemmed from the Soviet belief that, if their bluff were called, they had little to lose but face—a small risk in terms of the prospective benefits had the move gone undetected. And the strategic posture which made possible our positive reaction in Cuba is undergoing a radical change. Postulate a future Cuba—perhaps in space, perhaps in Iran—under the strategic philosophy discussed herewith, and one comes up with quite a different set of answers.—END

often in the past. But a deeply ingrained concept, a philosophy of life, a quasi-religious political conviction cannot be compromised: It is an indivisible entity. Therefore *no sound foreign policy can be devised by the West unless it recognizes the monumental impact of ideology upon world politics in general and upon relations between the bipolar groups in particular.*

Although the Communist bloc can no longer be regarded as monolithic, its coalescence is strong enough to hold together a multinational, multiracial conglomeration of European and Asiatic peoples despite inevitable frictions and "nonantagonistic contraditions." The combined power of this camp is held by leaders impregnated with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. For them, genuine peace is possible only when "imperialist" countries no longer exist. They permit only *ad hoc* agreements under the label of "peaceful coexistence." This is clearly indicated by Soviet terminology: Lenin, who is said to have originated the principle of "coexistence," called it "breathing spell," and other bloc leaders use the term *modus vivendi* interchangeably with coexistence.

The bloc's speedy attainment of socio-economic goals which would create the "material-technical basis for the transition to communism"—the present state being no more than "socialism"—presupposes such accommodation. This is not peace in the definitive Western sense, but merely an extended truce during which the "socialist forces" expect to achieve the necessary strength to reach and overtake the level of capitalism. Moreover, the Communists claim that the deterministic philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism proves "scientifically" that all other systems of human society are doomed. In view of the dialectical combination of the increase in Communist power and the expected decline of capitalism, the men in Moscow and Peking believe time to be on their side. Their POLITPROP is formulated accordingly.

Major technological breakthroughs have occurred in several fields of science: the communication system, transportation, the means of weapon delivery (missiles), and the utilization of atomic energy. From the point of view of world politics, these developments are interdependent. The most momentous of them all is the progress in atomic energy.

Provided the bipolar sides can maintain approximate equality of the nuclear and weapons systems, the resulting stalemate will be so firmly entrenched as to render general war useless as a means of foreign policy. Naturally, misunderstandings or miscalculations concerning the balance of the deterrent could conceivably lead to a holocaust, and there is need to maintain a high level of preparedness even beyond nuclear weapons. The Communist bloc's strong desire for an extended period of peaceful development and the West's caution against provocation appear to preclude major wars. However, the Sino-Soviet compromise formula in the Moscow Statement of December 1960, reiterated at the Twenty-second CPSU Congress, excepted "just" wars of "national liberation" in the "national democracies," *i.e.*, countries striving for "liberation" from colonial and semicolonial domination. In these cases the bloc will attempt to fill political and economic vacuums ostensibly without the use of its own forces (witness Laos, Cuba, Vietnam). But it almost certainly will stop at the brink of war. As a result of this historically unique situation, communication systems enable communism to maintain worldwide control of and influence over its parties. They relay messages and directives everywhere at a time when new and underdeveloped countries are rising and their vast uneducated masses are awakening.

The Communist posture makes it difficult for the free world to accept its protestations of peaceful intentions at face value. The study of Communist classics and the experience of Soviet behavior since 1917 and that of Red China since 1950 make it inadvisable to give credence to soothing bloc statements directed toward the West. It has always been a primary maxim of Communist tactical doctrine that all means are permissible to achieve a strategic objective, except where too much risk is involved. If one believes at all in the influence of doctrine upon the behavior and approaches of Communist governments, one cannot possibly take for granted their assurances.

Consequently, the West is compelled to keep up its deterrent power. It is hard to envisage nuclear disarmament so long as it might leave the West in a weaker position with regard to conventional armament and manpower. In any event, the missile race is bound to continue, whether under military or scientific auspices. Considering the Communists' tremendous concentration of scientific and economic development under the umbrella of the nuclear stalemate, the West has little choice but to do the same and do it even better.

Part of the technological factor is the beginning of space exploration which adds a new dimension to already existing problems. The conquests of space for all practical purposes began in the late fifties. For reasons of deterrence—military, political, and propagandistic—the "competitive coexistence" of the two camps must extend beyond terrestrial bounds. Since it is by no means established that problems of defense can be separated from the purposes of scientific endeavor, predominance in space may in the end become a decisive issue in the bipolar dispute. The thought cannot be dismissed that the conquest of space may change geopolitics into cosmopolitics and that the Mackinder aphorism "who rules the heartland, rules the world" will have to be paraphrased into "who conquers space, rules the earth."

Between 1957 and 1962, spectacular Soviet successes in space exploration outstripped the United States' more pedestrian progress, at least in terms of world propaganda, but since then the United States has shown impressive advances. The Kremlin knows that it is still ahead and will make every effort to remain so, but must realize that America may well catch up with Soviet achievements and perhaps surpass them. In this connection Lenin's remarks to the British author, H. G. Wells, in 1920 are significant:

"I, too, understand that all human conceptions are on the scale of our planet. They are based on the assumption that technical potentials, when developed to

(Continued on following page)

the full, will not go beyond 'terrestrial limits.' If we arrive at establishing interplanetary communications we must revise all our philosophical, social, and moral conceptions. In that case the technical potentials, having become unlimited, will impose upon us the end of violence as a means and method of progress."[3]

This should augur well for the space age. However, we have not yet progressed that far and if we had, there is no certainty that Moscow and Peking would agree with Lenin. Thus for reasons of self-preservation we must assume that the initial struggle for space (observation posts on artificial satellites and the moon) will scarcely be affected by Lenin's words. Since the Communists recognize international law only when it serves their designs, the value of a world-wide agreement on the "neutrality" of space (similar to that of certain polar regions), even if actually signed, would be questionable. For the time being, competition for the conquest of space, closely associated as it is with the development of missiles, will continue to play a considerable role in the political, military, and propaganda posture of the opposing camps.

How can the democracies cope with this novel situation? Can they master it without altering the very substance of their beliefs? Is it possible to maintain a *status quo* indefinitely?

The answers to these vital questions can be neither positive nor negative. They are too complex, too dependent upon a multitude of premises to be simple. But the overriding fact is that a *status quo* is an illusion and can only be a passing phase. New developments lead to new conditions which generate sudden or imperceptible changes. It is human nature to seek security, but it is human tragedy that such security, seemingly found, slips away.

In politics and international affairs, this expresses itself in never-ending sequences of undulation, comparable with the ebb and flow of the sea. The need of the individual to "adjust" himself to changing environments is paralleled by the state. If the individual fails, he is likely to suffer severe damage and so is the state. Neither the individual nor the state must necessarily sacrifice basic beliefs in order to modify their application to everyday life or practical politics. Accordingly, when the individual is confronted by a situation that threatens the very core of his existence, he first takes measures to safeguard it and then devises counteraction to guarantee his survival under the most favorable conditions. It is probable that in so doing he may be required to sacrifice some sectors of his *status quo*, but, in time, he can discover new sectors which compensate for them. It is the same with the state: its *status quo* can never be taken for granted. Stagnation would be the alternative and history proves that stagnation means decline.

More concretely, it would seem that the changing nature of world affairs has revealed the impossibility of traditional states maintaining their *status quo*. A study of the facts which have led to this situation and an evaluation of their effects on foreign policy and international relations must inevitably demonstrate that:

- It is urgent to shed long-held concepts of policy and diplomacy and to develop new ones befitting the requirements of the changing global environment;
- It is necessary to reconsider not only the thinking but also the organization and coordination of the machinery for policy-making and implementation;[4]
- It is essential to enhance and reorient the education of present and future generations so as to enable citizens of the democracies to understand the problems confronting their governments.[5]

Meanwhile the democracies face the almost impossible task of marshaling their national strength and resources in peacetime, when most people's sense of urgency is not so strong as it is in war or imminent military conflict, when the will to survive generates unity and willingness to sacrifice. During a cold war or "peaceful coexistence"—there is little difference between the two terms—the need for sacrifice is not so obvious. Thus the problem of defending against totalitarianism raises the question of how a decentralized parliamentary administration can face a centralized dictatorship without itself becoming dictatorial or totalitarian. Can the democracies adopt emergency measures when no war clouds gather on the horizon? Can they redirect and plan economy without explaining to the people the long-term seriousness of their situation? Can they maintain indefinitely a strong military establishment and tax the citizens heavily for its cost? Everything depends upon the national leaders' view of the nature and extent of the danger and upon the success or failure of the people to realize that it is better to sacrifice some of their blessings now than all of them later.

Opinions differ as to the nature of the threat. Even if the theses of this book be discounted, we can disregard the naïve, if not foolish, attitude of individuals who want peace at any price. Yet there are persons of considerable sophistication who are inclined to believe that if the USSR achieved economic power equal to that of the USA, this would engender satiation and relaxation, softening and finally eroding the Communist threat. More widespread is the view that international communism is on the decline because it is a monolith no longer, because there exist serious disagreements on policies and methods between Moscow and Peking, and because the denigration of Stalin has brought about a trend toward growing "independence" of bloc nations as well as Communist parties outside the orbit.

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3. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, September 15, 1959, quoting *Paris Presse*.

4. Cf. "Organizing for National Security," An Interim Staff Memorandum, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Washington, D.C., December 4, 1959, and "Organizing for Survival," in *Foreign Affairs*, New York, April 1960, by the same author.

5. Cf. Admiral H. Rickover, *Education and Freedom*, Dutton & Co., New York, 1959, *passim*.



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BALANCE SHEET OF THE PERMANENT CRISIS

Some of the most respected pundits of foreign affairs have proclaimed that, with the growing prosperity of Western Europe and the hope for eventual unification on the basis of the Common Market, the Soviet bloc will be faced not only with the might of the United States but with the new power of the "second force," United Western Europe, proving that capitalism is gaining momentum while socialist economy is in trouble. The pundits conclude from this that communism will lose its hold not only outside but also inside the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. They further point to the Khrushchevite reformist movement, deducing that the Marxist-Leninist secular religion is incapable of maintaining its sway. Their yardstick appears to be of Stalinist making, and they regard as a sign of decay the fact that terrorist absolutism has given way to greater variety in implementing the doctrine. They ignore the fact that Khrushchev's long-advocated amalgamation of Communist theory and practice has become more of a reality than ever before, resulting in a tactical pragmatism which should strengthen rather than weaken the position of both the party and the country. In fact, there is a general tendency to assume that, with Stalin gone, the cohesion of the movement has become looser and that, as a result, an erosion of communism is inevitable.

These analyses seem convincing to Westerners because they are conceived by Western minds. It would be desirable to review the issues more objectively, *i.e.*, to apply Communist thinking as well. On that basis, let us look briefly at the two principal problems connoting what is often regarded as the beginning of a Communist decline.

First, the Sino-Soviet dispute. There is enough evidence for students of Communist affairs to conclude that a controversy of considerable proportion has developed between Moscow and Peking. It began in earnest after the Twentieth CPSU Congress in which Khrushchev initiated his campaign to denigrate Stalin and triggered what the Italian Communist Party chief, Palmiro Togliatti, called "polycentrism." Ever since, the arguments have had their ups and downs; they were centered not so much on power prevalence as on methodology. Peking did not agree with Moscow on the desirability of "peaceful coexistence" and disarmament nor on the Soviet interpretation of the nuclear stalemate nor on the possibility of conquering "imperialism" without arms, merely through economic and technical "competition." Peking agreed with the concept of "national liberation wars" but did not like the reluctance of Moscow to implement this doctrine. One may add, parenthetically, that the personal dislike between Khrushchev and Mao played an important role in the controversy.

Second, during the years following the Twentieth CPSU Congress, there has developed, slowly but inexorably, a decentralized system of communism. At that Congress, Khrushchev, after having denounced Stalinist brutality, proclaimed that each socialist country should develop along its own "road to socialism." The reception of this thesis was mixed; the inveterate Stalinists (*e.g.*, East Germany's Ulbricht, Czechoslovakia's Novotny, France's Duclos, and, of course, Mao Tse-tung) questioned the wisdom of this decision; others like Togliatti accepted it with alacrity. As time went by, the concept of polycentric communism gained, and a gradual transition from monolithism to polycentrism took place, particularly in Europe. No such acceptance was forthcoming from Peking, whose two Asian neighbors, North Vietnam and North Korea, cautiously shared Mao's views. Thus the question arose as to whether an integral movement such as communism can continue to exist after having discarded centralized control.

Red China would answer in the negative, as would many free-world observers. The Eastern European Soviet Bloc would answer in the affirmative, believing that the experience and power of the USSR will find—or has found—the answer to this question. Khrushchev is a wholehearted believer in the secular religion and wants to prepare for the "transition to communism." He has made it clear repeatedly that such a transition is impossible under Stalinist duress and that, to speak in terms of experimental psychology, people must be motivated by "positive reinforcement" or, as the layman would say, by incentives—both ideological and material.

This, once again, leads us to the Chinese dilemma: Mao wants central leadership by Moscow on the one hand and is passionately striving to strengthen his sovereignty on the other hand. Albania shares these feelings. Both Communist states want to be in a position to veto decisions made in Communist summit meetings, while the Soviets prefer majority rule, well aware that the majority is at their disposition. But, although Mao cannot accept the Soviet rationale, he cannot break away from the Soviet bloc, as did Albania, without dealing a deadly blow to Red China and the international movement. The Chinese Communists may be stubborn and beset by a superiority complex, but they are also shrewd and realistic; they would permit a break only *in extremis*.

It would be dangerous for the West to expect such a break. There is always a possibility that it might happen, but the likelihood is remote. Arguments will continue for a long time; this dialectical dispute is one of the many that have beset the Communist movement without upsetting it. Admittedly, the controversy is serious, but both Moscow and Peking must realize that a split in governmental relations would entail far more serious consequences. However, should such a split occur, Marxism-Leninism as a secular religion might break into two camps even as the medieval church broke into eastern and western branches. Christianity has not perished as a result; communism probably will not either. Instead of one center, we would be faced by two, and the notion of some dreamers that we could then unite with one (the Soviet) to battle the other only testifies to their complete misunderstanding of the nature and objectives of communism.

Apart from the Sino-Soviet problem, can we expect

the movement to continue, once it has become a loosely organized "commonwealth of socialist countries"? We can and we should. We must expect change in the Communist camp just as elsewhere; stagnation, as pointed out earlier, means decay, as the Communists are well aware. Indeed, one might say that Khrushchev has done much to prevent such a stagnation which had set in under Stalin. Before the latter's death, the party had become a mere instrument in his hands and was on the verge of losing its character and initiative. One of the first actions Khrushchev undertook was the revival of the party as a power, and in that respect he was a better Leninist than Stalin. Khrushchev, however, went further. He launched what one might call a reformist trend, seeking to adjust the Soviet party and society to new conditions which Stalin had failed to recognize. In a sense, Khrushchev has initiated a renaissance not only of his own party but of the movement, and the opposition he found must be attributed to the reluctance of Communist chieftains throughout the world to accept the fact that Stalin was dead not only as a man but as an era. The aspects of totalitarianism had not changed but persuasion and "socialist legality" were to replace terror. A "New Soviet Man" was to be developed, a superman of sorts, who expected only what he needed, not what he deserved. Socialism was to proceed toward communism, not only on a "material-technical basis," but also on the assumption that people were ready to submit voluntarily to the laws of the Communist Moses so as to enter the "promised land." This is not a short-range undertaking, and it is doubtful whether Khrushchev, like Moses, will at least be able to see the land.

The West has good reason to be skeptical of these Communist dreams but it cannot afford to dismiss them altogether. More specifically, it would be foolhardy to claim that such a goal can never be achieved because Marxism-Leninism is not a secular religion but only a convenient phraseology for political manipulation. There still is a Communist bloc, not in the sense of a monolith, but as an ideological entity and a symbol of the ultimate objective which no Communist regime has foresworn.

Changes are occurring in the "socialist camp." They may be for better or for worse but they indicate movement. For the West and the rest of the free world, the flexibility and increasing sophistication of Khrushchevism, plus the emergence of an extremely aggressive Red China do not presage happy times. What is to be done?

Individuals and countries must roll with the punches. They must either go forward or decline. If the democracies insist on their *status quo*, time and fate will by-pass them. To obtain the New, they must relinquish the Old. In the lives of men nothing is permanent; the only immutable is change itself. It follows that in order not to lose such vital ingredients of democracy as the freedom and dignity of the individual, lesser privileges can and should be sacrificed. For example, the maintenance of a strong national economy need not necessarily be built upon the foundations of luxury and hedonism. The preservation of peacetime budgeting under conditions of nuclear stalemate is not necessarily the safest approach to national security. The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases must be subjected to and limited by communal and national responsibilities without abridging his freedom of expression. The self-interest of one nation has to be restricted by the requirements of allied or like-minded states and such restriction may be even tighter if the nation commands a leading position. The business of a country, be it political, economic, social, or technical, can no longer be conducted with haphazard *laissez-faire* individualism; it must be planned to meet the totalitarian threat.

These may seem to be unpopular suggestions, yet they propose remedies against democratic calcification and demonstrate the need for new departures toward vigorous policies. In the last analysis, the stalemate affecting East-West relations is not only of a technological nature; it is one in which the rejuvenation of policies and actions share equal importance.

The revolutionary convulsions of the globe have led to a rapid deterioration of traditional relations among nations. In the new world emerging, the West must match the youthful vigor of Communist brains and brawn. It has the resources to do so, but must develop an awareness of the nature of the threat it faces and channel its countermeasures to meet the core of the danger rather than its periphery. Most of all, it must throw an intellectual switch from the nineteenth to the twentieth century and prepare for the twenty-first. Once this is accomplished, the bipolar stalemate will no longer put the West in a purely defensive position. Knowing more of our adversaries than we do now, we would be better prepared to counter their moves or anticipate them. Perhaps, once this is appreciated on the other side of the Curtains, an accommodation might be obtained that is more than temporary. We cannot expect a "kingdom of heaven on earth," imperfect as we are. But we can hope for a long-range evolution which would eliminate futility and restore sanity. Admittedly, this hope is vague, yet it points to the only possible solution of the permanent crisis which disorients relations among nations and perpetuates that political no-man's land in which we dare not make war and cannot achieve peace.—END

Dr. London is Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies at The George Washington University, Washington, D. C. He has written extensively on Soviet affairs and world politics, and his books include The Seven Soviet Arts, Backgrounds of Conflict, *and* How Foreign Policy Is Made. *He has taught at City College, New York, at Brooklyn College, and at the University of Denver, and for a number of years he served with US government agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense. Dr. London is currently editing a symposium on the nonaligned Afro-Asian states in a divided world.*

Dr. Edward Teller, left, received the 1962 Enrico Fermi Award from President Kennedy at a White House ceremony on December 3 in recognition of his contributions to nuclear science. Mrs. Teller, center, was on hand.

—Wide World Photos

WE CAN'T TURN BACK THE NUCLEAR CLOCK

By Dr. Edward Teller

In a recent address to editors of United Press International in San Francisco, Dr. Teller, famed physicist and a principal architect of US nuclear power recently honored with the coveted Enrico Fermi Award for contributions to chemical and nuclear physics, warned that in our dangerous times . . .

- **To rely in the nuclear age on conventional weapons is akin to having depended on the bow and arrow after the advent of firearms.**
- **The clock of history cannot be turned back. Additional nations are bound to acquire nuclear knowledge and weapons. Hence we must face the fact that power for peace and war unavoidably rests on the use of the atom.**
- **Although the nuclear age is fraught with danger, it is filled with opportunity too, and eventually a supranational authority must be created to guarantee advance in a peaceful world.**

THE development of the hydrogen bomb was preceded by a discussion of fateful importance. In this discussion, it was argued that our destructive power was great enough and that nothing more was needed. It was stated, with some emphasis, that if we refrained from developing a thermonuclear device, a hydrogen bomb, the Russians would also refrain. President Truman decided that we should go ahead. We did. And our collective efforts were successful. Less than a year after the explosion of the first hydrogen bomb by the United States the Russians announced an explosion of what they termed a hydrogen bomb. I do not know precisely what they exploded, but there were definite indications that the Soviets were quite close to developing something similar to what we had successfully accomplished. Over the intervening years thermonuclear weapons have come to be acknowledged as a necessary component in our national defense.

I mention these old facts for a particular reason. Progress in nuclear explosives has been rapid. Progress in the discussion has been nonexistent. We are